New singles, young and old
I. Introduction: Singles and families in post-mainstream Japan
Think again about Okano’s women and Brinton’s men
II. The first modern demographic revolution and the Japanese mainstream family form
A. Important for Japan, common to modernity
- Higher mortality, lower fertility
- Preference for nuclear family/household
- Preference for marrying spouse-companion rather than new household member
B. The Japanese version had entailments for individual life courses
C. The Japanese version of the modern family had its own “life-course” (a kind of structured diversity)
III. What happens to the family in “late modernity”?
A second demographic revolution (post-modern/ post-industrial)
- falling birth rates below population “replacement”
- aging demographic profile
- rising age of first marriage and rising numbers of never-marrieds
- rising divorce rates but also rising remarriage rates —› serial marriage —› single parents and blended families
- rising numbers of single-person households
- the erosion of heterosexual normativity as official convention
IV. Developments in post-mainstream Japan
- falling birth rates now well below population “replacement”
- aging demographic profile
- rising age of first marriage and rising numbers of never-marrieds
- rising divorce rates although remarriage rates are not strong —› single parents but few blended families
- rising numbers of single-person households among young and old (fastest growing household type)
- the erosion of heterosexual normativity as official convention
- some increase in “international” marriages
V. Is it a crisis of the family or a release from restrictive norms?
A. Terms of moral panic that spread through the 1990s
- “falling birth rate” (shōshika 少子化)
- “late marriage” (bankonka 晩婚化)
- “child abuse” (jidō gyakutai 児童虐待)
- “domestic violence” (domesuchiku baiorensu ドメスッチクバイオレンス)
- “household violence” (kateinai bōryoku 家庭内暴力, meaning violence of children towards parents)
- “self-confinement” (hikikomori 引きこもり)
- “freeters” (fureetaa フリーター)
- “parasite singles” (parasaito shingaru パラサイトシングル)
- “loser dogs” (make-inu 負け犬)
- “devil hags” (oni-baba オババ)
B. From parasite singles to devil hags
C. Are the new young singles parasites or pragmatists—or idealists?
VII. So why are they resisting marriage?
A. What are they resisting? Marriage, yes, but what is it about marriage they are resisting?
Source: Ogawa, Retherford, Matsukura, “Japan’s Declining Fertility and Policy Responses” (2006)
- Women’s educational gains
- The rising proportion of single women who work for pay
- The near-disappearance of arranged marriage
- The major decline in co-residence with parents
- For many so-called “parasite singles,” the prospect of a substantial drop in standard of living if they get married
- The increasing prevalence and social acceptability of premarital sex
- The emergence of a “new-single concept” that makes it socially acceptable to enjoy single life without the pressure to get married
- Women increasingly want more help from husbands and a more egalitarian marital relationship—and these desires lead women to articulate more clearly long-standing anxieties about their duties as wives, mothers, and daughters-in-law
B. How late is late? Are they postponing marriage indefinitely?
VIII. So what is to be done?
- What is the government doing?
- Does gender equality promote fertility?
IX. LGBT rights
- Homosexuality is legal in Japan
- No legal recognition of same-sex marriage or civil union partnership
- No national legal protection for discrimination by sexual orientation
- Individuals who transgender through sexual reassignment surgery can change legal gender
- Japan government will provide legal certificate to Japanese citizens who marry same-sex foreign partners in countries where same-sex marriage is legal
X. Divorce, Japan style